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Despite  the  22nd (French-Canadian) Battalion’s extra-
ordinary courage on the battlefields 
of Europe throughout the First 
World War, its reputation remains 
tarnished by the belief that it suffered 
from a disciplinary problem. In 
fact, the unit’s behaviour has led 
to a considerable debate. Whereas 
several historians have argued 
that the battalion’s thousands of 
infractions and five executions show 
a disciplinary problem, others have 
stated that a lack of comparison 
with other units of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force (CEF) render 
these figures, and this assumption, 
unfounded. 
 The first historian to suggest a 
discipline problem was Desmond 
Morton in a 1972 article entitled 
“The Supreme Penalty.” He noted 
that the men of the battalion were 
“conspicuously over-represented” 
amongst the executed soldiers of the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force.1 In Le 
22e bataillon (canadien-français), 1914-
1919, Jean-Pierre Gagnon argued 
that the written evidence provided 
by the commander of the battalion, 
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l  T h o m a s 
Tremblay, and statistics on the unit’s 
minor and court-martial infractions 
confirm its poor reputation.2 More 
than a quarter of a century after 
Morton’s article, historians continue 
to discuss the poor discipline of 
the battalion. In a master’s thesis 
entitled “Arbitrary Justice?:  A 
Comparative Analysis of Canadian 
Death Sentences Passed and Death 
Sentences Commuted during the 
First World War,” Teresa Iacobelli 
suggests that the battalion’s overall 
poor behaviour was an important 
factor in its numerous executions. 
She also referred to the unit as the 
“infamously poorly disciplined 
22nd Battalion.”3 In For Freedom and 
Honour?: The Story of the 25 Canadian 
Volunteers Executed in the First World 
War, however, Andrew B. Godefroy 
concluded that “due to a lack of any 
detailed research on the issue, one 
cannot properly argue as to whether 
the number of disciplinary infractions 
in the 22nd Battalion was high or low 
when compared to other units in the 
CEF.”4 Godefroy did not provide 
this comparison. Similarly, Patrick 
Bouvier, in a study entitled Déserteurs 
et insoumis. Les Canadiens français 
et la justice militaire, questioned the 
validity of the battalion’s notoriety. 
Like Godefroy he argued that, without 
a comparative base, it is impossible 
to conclude that the number of 
infractions committed by French-
Canadians was truly representative 
of their discipline.5 Bouvier did not 
provide this comparative material.
 This article will reassess the 22nd 
Battalion’s behaviour in a comparative 
context.6 Through a qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the discipline 
of the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
(22nd, 24th, 25th, and 26th Battalions) 
of the 2nd Canadian Division, it will 
demonstrate that the 22nd Battalion 
did, in fact, suffer from a disciplinary 
problem. For results to be as fair as 
possible, the comparison units must 
share an operational history similar 
to that of the “Van Doos,” as the 22nd 
Battalion was familiarly known. Of 
Abstract: This article explores two 
issues relating to the Canadian 
experience during the First World 
War, but more specifically, to that 
of the 22nd (French-Canadian) 
Battalion (commonly referred to as 
the “Van Doos”). It first considers the 
assumption that the 22nd Battalion 
suffered from a disciplinary problem. 
By examining the disciplinary records 
of the other three battalions of the 
5th Brigade (the brigade of which 
the “Van Doos were a part) and 
comparing them to that of the 22nd 
Battalion, this article conclusively 
demonstrates that the unit did suffer 
from a disciplinary problem. This 
article also examines the causes 
of the unit’s disciplinary problems. 
Evidence suggests that poor morale 
was the likely cause.
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4the hundreds of units that comprised 
the CEF, only the battalions of the 
5th Canadian Infantry Brigade meet 
that criterion. They not only took 
part in the same minor and major 
operations, but spent the entirety 
of their war alongside the 22nd 
Battalion. The evidence from the 
comparative information suggests 
that the 22nd Battalion suffered from 
poor discipline. Further evidence 
suggests that this poor discipline 
resulted from poor morale caused 
by the arrival of new recruits and a 
change in leadership.
Discipline in the 5th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade
The Ill-disciplined “Van Doos”
On 15 October 1914, the 22nd Battalion was born after the 
Canadian government officially 
approved the creation of a French-
Canadian unit. The battalion was 
unique in the CEF as the only 
combatant unit whose official 
language was French. The majority 
of its soldiers were French-speaking 
and officers gave their orders and 
instructions in French. After months 
of training in Saint-Jean, Quebec and 
Amherst, Nova Scotia, the battalion 
departed for Europe aboard HMT 
Saxonia on 20 May 1915. The unit 
arrived in England nine days later, 
and began training at East Sandling 
camp. On 15 September 1915, these 
inexperienced soldiers were finally 
put to the test as they left their 
training fields and headed to France. 
 The most convincing evidence 
that justifies the 22nd Battalion’s 
reputation are the various accounts 
and comments of officers and 
soldiers from various battalions, 
brigades and divisions during 
and after the war. During the war 
the commanding officers of the 
battalion often complained about 
the unit’s disciplinary problems. 
These complaints also show that the 
battalion’s problems began after the 
Somme operations of 1916 and lasted 
well into the summer of 1917. 
 The Somme operations proved 
especially costly. Although the 
battalion successfully captured the 
village of Courcelette, it suffered 
many casualties and the composition 
of the unit was significantly altered as 
a result. By the end of December 1916, 
the battalion had received more than 
500 reinforcements who constituted 
more than half of the membership 
of the battalion. The commanding 
officers of the battalion, Lieutenant-
Colonel Thomas Tremblay and 
Major Arthur Dubuc, who replaced 
Tremblay while the latter had took ill, 
first noted the poor discipline of their 
unit in November 1916. Tremblay was 
still in hospital when Dubuc paid him 
a visit in London. Tremblay noted 
their conversation in his diary: “Le 
nouveau bataillon a dans ces cadres un 
trop grand nombre d’hommes plutôt 
dégénérés...Enfin, Dubuc m’assure 
que la situation s’améliore, que 
graduellement le bataillon reviendra 
ce qu’il était.”7 Unfortunately, the 
situation did not improve and the 
battalion’s discipline deteriorated 
to the point where the commanding 
officer of the 2nd Canadian Division, 
Major-General R.E.W. Turner, got 
involved. In January 1917, Tremblay 
noted in his diary, “Il y a beaucoup 
d’absence sans permission au 22e et 
le Général Turner est anxieux que je 
retourne en France au plus vite.”8 The 
battalion’s poor discipline resulted 
in much criticism from several other 
brigade and divisional commanders.9 
For example, Brigadier-General 
H.D.B. Ketchen, commander of the 
6th Brigade, noted that “The crime 
of desertion from the trenches is 
very prevalent in this Battalion [the 
22nd], and it is considered that unless 
examples are immediately made 
in such cases, that this crime will 
continue.”10 
Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas 
Tremblay (left), commanding 
officer of the 22nd Battalion, 
and his second-in-command, 
Major Arthur Dubuc (right), 
were both aware of the 
disciplinary problems among 
their men and took “drastic 
measures” to repair the 
discipline of the battalion.
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5 For the next eight months, the 
battalion seemed to be in crisis 
as Tremblay, Dubuc, and other 
commanders frequently complained 
about insubordinate behaviour. As a 
result, Tremblay had to use drastic 
measures to repair the discipline of 
his unit. During a meeting with the 
unit’s officers, on 3 March 1917, he 
reminded them that it was their duty 
to “raidir la discipline,” if there was 
any chance of fixing “l’état pitoyable 
du bataillon.”11 Tremblay used harsh 
penalties, such as courts-martial and 
executions for desertion, to restore 
the character that the unit had prior 
to Courcelette. Tremblay’s measures 
were successful. By the summer of 
1917, the situation in the “Van Doos” 
stabilized and improved. For example, 
at Private Alexandre Dumesnil’s 
court-martial in September 1917, 
Dubuc noted, “The state of discipline 
of the Battalion is at present very 
good. Absences without leave are 
very rare.”12
 After the war, various veterans 
who served with and alongside the 
“Van Doos” also commented on the 
battalion’s discipline. In fact, many 
attempted to justify or even apologize 
for it. In 1934, Claudius Corneloup, 
of the 22nd Battalion, published 
a novel entitled La Coccinelle du 
22e, which was loosely based on 
the front-line experiences of the 
“Van Doos.” Within its pages, he 
reproduced a conversation between 
a veteran and a young recruit. 
The exchange illustrates the unit’s 
indifference towards the rules and 
regulations of the military. When 
the recruit expressed concern about 
being arrested by the military police 
for an illegal absence, the veteran 
responded: “C’est parce que c’est ta 
première escapade mon garçon!...
Quand tu y seras habitué, tu diras 
comme l’ami Germinal: ‘Je m’en 
fiche!’”13 Another soldier also cried 
out: “Une permission!...c’est bon pour 
une recrue.”14 
 In  1962-63 ,  the  Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) 
conducted a series of interviews 
with First World War veterans. The 
men talked about the motivations 
for their enlistments, the campaigns 
in which they took part, their lives 
after the war, and the memories 
and friendships with which they 
returned from the front. However, 
when interviewing soldiers of the 
“Van Doos,” or when referring to the 
unit itself with soldiers of other units, 
the interviewers kept asking about 
its rowdiness and indiscipline at the 
front. For example, Major Mitchell, 
of the 24th Battalion, noted that the 
Van Doos “weren’t as susceptible to 
discipline as we [the 24th Battalion] 
were.”15 He even recalled a humorous 
anecdote about their indiscipline: 
“They [the Van Doos] scared the pants 
off the quartermaster in this Sandling 
Camp, I remember they chased him. 
There was some trouble over food. 
We went out there and here was the 
quartermaster running away and the 
whole gang after him.”16 His fellow 
officer F. Portwine nevertheless 
added, “No, but they were good 
fighters, give them credit.”17 A veteran 
of the 25th Battalion remarked, “but 
these Frenchmen are damn good 
fighters when the 22nd was a good 
unit.”18 
 The statistics that were gathered 
from the Part II daily orders and 
court-martial proceedings suggest 
that the complaints and comments 
of officers and soldiers alike were 
well founded. The Part II daily orders 
provide an overview of discipline as 
they include every minor infraction 
that was punished. During the unit’s 
three years at the front, a total of 2,475 
minor infractions were punished. See 
Table 1 for their breakdown. 
 The most noticeable statistic is 
how frequent illegal absences were in 
comparison to all other infractions.20 
In fact, of the 2,475 infractions, 1,660 
were for the crime of illegal absence, 
67 percent of the total. During its 
first year at the front, the unit was 
thus punished for an average of 
86.4 infractions per month, 62.6 
infractions during its second year, 
and 52.9 during its final year. The 
unit’s average throughout the war 
was 66.9 infractions per month.21 A 
more detailed examination of minor 
infractions also demonstrates that 
the transition from life in England 
to life at the front was quite difficult. 
October 1915 was the unit’s most 
troublesome month when members 
were punished for a total of 151 
minor infractions.22 Although the 
unit’s initial trench tours proved be 
relatively uneventful compared to 
later ones, they nonetheless made 
the acquaintance of conditions that 
often made life unbearable in the 
frontlines such as frequent food and 
water shortages and lice infestations. 
The disciplinary problems continued 
as the men of the unit were punished 
for 122 and 117 minor infractions 
in November 1915 and December 
1915.23 By January and February 
1916, the behaviour of the unit began 
to improve; the number of minor 
Table 1 – Minor infractions of the 22nd Battalion19
Year Absences Drunkenness Other Infractions Total
October 1915 to 
September 1916 731 104 202 1,037
October 1916 to 
September 1917 468 87 196 751
October 1917 to 
November 1918 461 71 155 687
Total 1,660 262 553 2,475
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6infractions dropped to 86 and 35, 
respectively. This change coincided 
with the arrival of Tremblay who 
replaced Colonel Frédéric-Mondelet 
Gaudet  as  commander of  the 
battalion. During Tremblay’s first 
period in command, the unit only 
went through one difficult patch 
in March and April 1916 when 
there were respectively 95 and 124 
punishments for infractions. This was 
most likely the result of the battalion’s 
first taste of intense combat at the St. 
Éloi Craters. According to the soldiers 
of the “Van Doos,” it was one of most 
dangerous assignments they drew 
throughout the war. Joseph Henri 
Chaballe noted that “bien des soldats 
d’expérience considère la ‘bataille 
des craters’ comme l’épreuve la plus 
terrible à laquelle les Canadiens 
eurent à faire face durant la guerre, 
sauf peut-être à Passchendaele.”24 
Apart from these two months, the unit 
was punished for only 35 infractions 
in February 1916, 74 in May, 49 in 
June, 45 in July, and 36 in August.25 
In September 1916, the battalion once 
again went through a difficult period 
as members were punished 103 times. 
This may have resulted from the 
unit’s participation in its first major 
This series of photos, taken in July 
1916, show soldiers from the 22nd 
Battalion engaged in various tasks in 
the trenches.
Top: Here, five soldiers work to repair 
a muddy trench. The men are wearing 
helmets and most are bent over 
shovelling. 
Middle: Two men are standing on the 
trench floor while the third is laying down 
reading in a small dugout (funkhole) in 
the side of the trench. The dugout has 
corrugated metal cover that is propped 
up and has a helmet and mess tin sitting 
on it. There is a gas alarm hanging from 
the wall of the trench next to the dug 
out and a number of Ross rifles with 
bayonets affixed leaning beside it. 
Bottom: Two men stand on the trench 
floor in front of a dugout. The man on 
the left side of the photo is holding a 
Ross rifle. The second soldier is standing 
beside him with his arms akimbo.
CW
M
 1
99
20
04
4-
25
5
CW
M
 1
99
20
04
4-
24
2
CW
M
 1
99
20
04
4-
24
3
Dagenais - Discipline in 22nd Bn.indd   6 1/26/2010   10:08:44 AM
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss4/2
7unit’s commanding officers  sought 
to correct the problem through the 
use of legal procedures. 
The 24th Battalion 
(Victoria Rifles of Canada)
An examination of the other units of the 5th Brigade is much more 
complicated than that for the “Van 
Doos.” Although quantitative sources 
are available, qualitative ones are 
much more difficult to locate. The 
22nd Battalion has been commented 
on and studied by various historians 
and veterans alike, but the same 
cannot be said about the other units 
of the 5th Brigade. Although the 
letters found in the courts-martial 
proceedings do provide some written 
statements on the overall discipline of 
the units, such letters were not always 
available. This analysis will therefore 
focus on the statistics that were 
gathered from the Part II daily orders 
and court-martial proceedings.  
 A study of the minor infractions 
reveals two contrasting stories. 
Whereas members of the “Van 
Doos” were punished 2,475 times, 
the Victoria Rifles’ personnel were 
punished only 911 times. (Table 3)
 These statistics seem to indicate 
that the 24th Battalion was much more 
disciplined than the “Van Doos.” 
The battalion’s monthly average of 
infractions was much lower with 
24.6 from October 1915 to September 
1916, 25.3 the following year, and 23.9 
during their final year at the front. 
The unit’s average throughout the 
war was 24.6 infractions per month. 
However, like the “Van Doos,” the 
Victoria Rifles also had problems 
Table 3 – Minor infractions of the 24th Battalion29
Year Absences Drunkenness Other Infrac. Total
October 1915 to
September 1916 128 60 108 296
October 1916 to
September 1917 104 51 149 304
October 1917 to
November 1918 121 59 131 311
Total 353 170 388 911
campaign, the Battle of the Somme. 
However, unlike the period following 
St. Éloi, Tremblay was not there to 
restore discipline, and infractions did 
not diminish. Infractions reached 103 
in January 1917.26 
 Court-martial proceedings also 
paint a negative picture of the unit’s 
behaviour. (Table 2) 
 Like the evidence provided by the 
Part II daily orders, illegal absences 
(desertion and absence without 
leave) were also the most frequent 
infractions that were punished.28 
The “Van Doos” were charged with 
118 counts of illegal absences; that is 
50.6 percent of all their infractions. 
These statistics also demonstrate 
that the most troublesome period 
for the “Van Doos” were the months 
after Courcelette at the Somme 
to the end of 1917; close to half 
(49.4 percent) of all infractions were 
committed during these months. 
What is even more significant is that 
just under 60 percent of all illegal 
absences that were brought before 
courts-martial occurred during that 
time. These statistics thus confirm 
Dubuc’s and Tremblay’s various 
complaints, and, as courts-martial 
significantly increased after March 
1917, they further show that the 
Table 2 – Court-martial convictions of the 22nd Battalion27
Infraction  Sept 1915 to Feb 1916
Mar 1916 to 
Sept 1916
Oct 1916 to 
Feb 1917
Mar 1917 to 
Dec 1917
Jan 1918 to 
11 Nov 1918 Postwar Total
Desertion 0 2 7 23 10 0 42
AWOL 1 5 15 25 21 9 76
Illegal absence- 
related  infractions 0 0 5 1 7 1 14
Drunkenness 5 1 2 3 5 1 17
Insubordination 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
Theft/Fraud 0 3 2 4 6 7 22
Striking officer or 
other rank 0 0 1 0 2 0 3
Disobeying 0 1 2 1 0 0 4
Negligence with 
firearms
0 2 8 6 9 0 25
Other 0 2 3 7 7 9 28
Total 6 16 45 70 69 27 233
Dagenais - Discipline in 22nd Bn.indd   7 1/26/2010   10:08:44 AM
5
: “Une Permission! C’est bon pour une recrue” Discipline and Illegal Absences in the 22nd (French-Canadian) Battalion, 1915-1919
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
8with illegal absences. A total of 
353 punishments were given for 
illegal absences. They accounted 
for 38.7 percent of all infractions, 
compared to drunkenness (18.7 
percent), which was the second 
most frequent infraction. 
 The statistics gathered from 
court-martial proceedings also 
indicate a similar situation. Only 
119 infractions were convicted 
by courts-martial throughout the 
war. (Table 4) 
 These statistics also seem to 
indicate that the 24th Battalion 
was much more disciplined than 
the “Van Doos.” This is especially 
true with illegal absences; men of 
the Victoria Rifles were convicted 
by courts-martial only 35 times 
compared to 118 for the 22nd 
Battalion. Not unlike the Van 
Doos, however, illegal absences 
were the most common breaches. 
Thirty-five (29.4 percent) of the 
courts-martial convictions were 
for AWOL and desertion. 
 No member of the Victoria Rifles 
was executed during the First World 
War. Only three death sentences 
were issued, but all were commuted. 
With every death sentence passed 
came several letters and appeals 
from the commanding officers of 
the 24th Battalion, 5th Brigade, 
and 2nd Division. For example, 
Sergeant F. Jennings was sentenced 
to death for an absence that lasted 
from 21 January 1916 until he was 
apprehended on 8 January 1917.31 
Appeals came from all levels of the 
Canadian Corps. Lieutenant-Colonel 
W.H. Clark-Kennedy, commander 
of the 24th Battalion, was the first to 
urge mitigation of the sentence by 
arguing that the “state of discipline 
of the battalion [was] good.”32 This 
was followed by the appeals from 
Major-General Burstall, 2nd Infantry 
Division, and Brigadier-General 
Ross, 5th Infantry Brigade. Burstall 
argued that the death penalty be 
commuted “because the discipline 
in the 24th Canadian Battalion is 
and has been good.”33 Ross likewise 
added that “in view of the fact that the 
discipline of the 24th Battalion is good 
and an example is not required…I 
recommend that the sentence be 
commuted.”34 
 The fact that Clark-Kennedy’s 
opinion of his battalion’s discipline 
The 24th Battalion, commanded 
by Lieutenant-Colonel William H. 
Clark-Kennedy, VC (left), was a 
well-disciplined unit. It was not 
necessary to invoke the death 
penalty to set an example to others 
in this battalion.
Table 4 – Court-martial convictions of the 24th Battalion30
Infraction Sep 1915 to Feb 1916
Mar 1916 to 
Sep 1916
Oct 1916 to 
Feb 1917
Mar 1917 to 
Dec 1917
Jan 1918 to
11 Nov 1918 Postwar Total
Desertion 0 2 1 2 0 0 5
AWOL 1 2 4 8 7 8 30
Illegal absence related  
infractions 0 0 0 2 0 3 5
Drunkenness 2 1 5 1 1 0 10
Insubordination 0 0 0 4 2 2 8
Theft/Fraud 0 0 2 0 2 3 7
Striking officer or other rank 1 0 0 0 1 1 3
Disobeying 1 0 0 2 0 18 21
Negligence with firearms 2 0 4 4 7 1 18
Other 0 1 0 4 3 4 12
Total 7 6 16 27 23 40 119
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9were shared by several officers and 
outsiders render his comments 
much more credible. Evidence does 
not suggest that the 24th Battalion, 
or any of the brigade’s battalions, 
attempted to hide cases of indiscipline 
on a regular basis. In fact, such a 
practice would not have benefited 
a commanding officer, and might 
have led to significant disciplinary 
problems. His men undoubtedly 
would have taken advantage of such 
a situation as they would have been 
aware that their actions would not 
result in an appearance before court-
martial. Thus, as was the case with 
the “Van Doos,” an undisciplined 
24th Battalion, or any other, would 
likely have attracted the notice of 
brigade and division commanders as 
well as that of other units. 
The 25th (Nova Scotia) Battalion
The record of minor infractions also suggest that the 25th Battalion 
was much more disciplined than the 
“Van Doos.” (Table 5) 
 During the unit’s three years at 
the front, a total of only 920 minor 
infractions were punished. The 
battalion’s monthly average was only 
28 infractions from October 1915 to 
September 1916, 21 the following 
year, and 25.5 during their final 
year at the front. The unit’s average 
throughout the war was 24.8 per 
month. However, as with the “Van 
Doos,” the majority of the unit’s 
infractions were illegal absences. 
Throughout the war, a total of 382 
punishments were given for illegal 
absences, which accounted for 41.5 
percent of the unit’s minor infractions. 
 Court-martial proceedings also 
suggest the good behaviour of the 
unit. A total of 109 infractions were 
convicted by courts-martial. (Table 6) 
 The contrast with the “Van Doos” 
was still more marked with illegal 
absences, with only 25 convictions. 
Illegal absences were nevertheless 
the most frequent court-martial 
conviction (22.9 percent).
 Despite the battalion’s good 
discipline, one of its soldiers was 
executed during the war. Private 
Elsworth Young suffered the death 
penalty as a result of an illegal 
a b s e n c e  d u r i n g  t h e  S o m m e 
operations. Although there is very 
little evidence concerning this court-
martial, it is possible that the battalion 
recommended commutation. In 
his study of executions, Godefroy 
noted that the commander of the 
2nd Division, Major-General R.E.W. 
Turner, had asked for the commutation 
of the death sentence in this case.37 
As was demonstrated with the 24th 
Battalion, the recommendations 
of the division were generally 
similar to those of the brigade and 
the battalion. Moreover, available 
evidence concerning the 22nd and 
24th Battalions, and Teresa Iacobelli’s 
work have suggested that the overall 
discipline of the battalion was the most 
important rationale when arguing 
for or against the death penalty. 
Although it cannot be fully proven, 
circumstantial evidence suggests that 
the unit sought the commutation of 
Private Young’s sentence based on 
Table 5: Minor infractions of the 25th Battalion35
Year Absences Drunkenness Other Infraction Total
Oct 1915 to Sep 1916 123 60 153 336
Oct 1916 to Sep 1917 95 44 113 252
Oct 1917 to Oct 1918 164 34 134 332
Total 382 138 400 920
Table 6 – Court-martial convictions of the 25th Battalion36
Infraction Sep 1915 to Feb 1916
Mar 1916 to 
Sep 1916
Oct 1916 to 
Feb 1917
Mar 1917 to 
Dec 1917
Jan 1918 to
11 Nov 1918 Postwar Total
Desertion 0 2 1 0 0 0 3
AWOL 0 4 4 5 7 2 22
Illegal absence related  
infractions 0 2 1 2 2 1 8
Drunkenness 8 6 4 4 3 0 25
Insubordination 0 0 0 1 5 0 6
Theft/Fraud 1 1 0 1 3 0 6
Striking officer or other rank 0 1 0 0 3 1 5
Disobeying 0 0 0 1 3 0 4
Negligence with firearms 0 0 3 1 3 1 8
Other 0 2 2 6 8 4 22
Total 9 18 15 21 37 9 109
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the good discipline of the unit. Corps 
and army commands nevertheless 
confirmed the death sentence. Private 
Young was shot on the morning of 29 
October 1916.38
The 26th (New Brunswick) 
Battalion
The examination of the 26th (New Brunswick) Battalion was more 
problematic than the other units of 
the 5th Brigade as the Part II daily 
orders for the first two years of the 
war are missing. (Table 7) 
 From January 1917 to December 
1917, the 26th Battalion was punished 
19.1 times per month, and 38.5 times 
per month during its final year at 
the front. The 22nd Battalion, on the 
other hand, was punished 62.6 and 
49.6 times per month during the 
same time periods. However, like 
the “Van Doos,” the unit also had 
a problem with illegal absences as 
they accounted for 53.9 percent of the 
unit’s total infractions. 
 Court-martial proceedings also 
suggest the unit’s good behaviour. 
Throughout the war there was a 
total of only 90 convictions. (Table 8) 
There were only 28 counts of illegal 
absences as compared to 118 in the 
22nd Battalion. Remarkably, only 
two men in the 26th Battalion were 
charged with desertion. Nonetheless, 
illegal absences were the most 
common court-martial conviction, 
28 of 90 (31.1 percent) were for AWOL 
and desertion.
Problems of Morale in the 
22nd Battalion
Despite the fact that several historians have commented on 
the 22nd battalion’s poor discipline, 
very few have attempted to explain 
its cause.41 This next section argues 
that poor morale, resulting from the 
arrival of new recruits and a change 
in leadership, played an important 
role in the disciplinary problems of 
the unit.42 Although military morale 
is a very difficult topic to examine 
as it is subjective, several historians 
and specialists nonetheless agree that 
there is a link between poor morale 
and poor discipline, and that one of 
the most significant consequences of 
poor morale is the aberrant behaviour 
of soldiers.43
 When dealing with the 22nd 
Battalion, it is easy to demonstrate 
that during its most troublesome 
period (September 1916 to July 
1917) the unit did suffer morale 
problems, especially if discipline is 
a good measure of a unit’s spirits. 
Throughout the war, but particularly 
after September 1916, members of 
the unit contravened regulations 
much more frequently than any 
other battalion in the 5th Brigade. 
More importantly, the evidence left 
by Tremblay and Georges P. Vanier, 
who served alongside Tremblay 
in the battalion, confirms such a 
breakdown of morale. In a letter 
dated 12 October 1916, for example, 
Vanier commented on the character of 
the unit: “Le batallion a bien changé 
[depuis Courcelette]; peu des anciens 
restent. La gaieté d’autrefois ne règne 
plus: cela n’est pas surprennant 
quand on considère les amis qui ont 
fait le suprême sacrifice. Ça rend 
un peu triste…”44 When Tremblay 
returned to the unit in February 
1917, he noticed that the battalion’s 
problems were much more than 
disciplinary. On 2 March 1917, he 
complained that “L’esprit de corps 
si remarquable au 22e avant la 
Somme n’existe pas, il faut tout de 
suite la ressusciter.”45 Tremblay was 
extremely distressed about the state 
of his battalion which explains why 
he resorted to harsh discipline to fix 
it. His actions proved fruitful. By the 
Like the 24th Battalion, the 25th 
Battalion had fewer disciplinary 
problems than the 22nd Battalion. Only 
one man from the unit was executed and 
evidence suggests that the battalion 
tried to have his sentence commuted. 
Here the battalion commanding officer, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Blois, talks 
with his soldiers, February 1918.
Table 7 – Minor infractions of the 26th Battalion39
Year Absences Drunkenness Other Infractions Total
Jan to Dec 1917 104 26 100 230
Jan to Oct 1918 228 28 129 385
Total 332 54 229 615
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summer of 1917, he commented that 
the morale and the character of the 
battalion was improving. On 3 July 
1917, he noted that his men were 
“de la plus belle humeur.”46 Even 
as the unit was involved in bloody 
operations at Hill 70 in mid-August 
1917, Tremblay again noted that “le 
moral ne pourrait être meilleur.”47 
 Available evidence suggests that 
the arrival of reinforcements, officers 
and other ranks, after the Somme 
operations of 1916 significantly 
affected the morale of the unit. 
Reinforcements can have a 
significant impact on morale as 
they may alter a unit’s “esprit 
de corps” as new recruits may 
not share the same values and 
bond as veterans. Lieutenant-
Colonel Roy R. Grinker and 
Major John P. Speigel believe 
that when soldiers do not share 
this “esprit de corps,” poor 
morale will ensue.48 Soldiers 
will perform their duties out of 
fear of punishment rather than 
out of a sense of pride, and will 
show their resentment by an 
occasional “breach of discipline 
or acts of hostility.”49
 As a result of the casualties 
suffered in September 1916, 
the unit received more than 
500 reinforcements, half of the unit’s 
manpower.50 In fact, the battalion 
had lost so many men that Georges 
Vanier noted that “the battalion 
has changed to such an extent that 
one could hardly recognize it.”51 
Tremblay complained in November 
1916 that the battalion’s rookies 
“n’ont pas l’esprit de corps que nous 
avions développé chez nos hommes 
jusqu’à Courcelette.”52 It is apparent 
that these reinforcements did not 
share the same commitment as the 
battalion’s veterans. For example, 
between October 1916 and March 
1917, soldiers from the unit were 
punished by courts-martial 27 times 
for illegal absences.53 Out of these 
27 illegal absences, 14 (51.9 percent) 
were committed by soldiers who 
were amongst the soldiers that joined 
the unit after the Somme operations. 
Moreover, seven (25.9 percent) had 
joined the battalion only a few months 
before Courcelette. Only six (22 
percent) had been with the unit 
for more than a year. 
 In fact, evidence suggests 
that these reinforcements were 
simply not up to par with the 
men that gave their lives at 
Courcelette; this was due to the 
poor quality of the battalions 
from which the reinforcements 
came. In the weeks that followed 
the Somme offensives, the unit 
Table 8 – Court-martial convictions of the 26th Battalion40
Infraction Sep 1915 to Feb 1916
Mar 1916 to 
Sep 1916
Oct 1916 to 
Feb 1917
Mar 1917 to 
Dec 1917
Jan 1918 to
11 Nov 1918 Postwar Total
Desertion 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
AWOL 0 2 0 9 10 5 26
Illegal absence related  
infractions 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
Drunkenness 0 0 2 1 6 2 11
Insubordination 0 0 0 3 2 0 5
Theft/Fraud 0 0 0 1 7 3 11
Striking officer or other rank 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
Disobeying 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Negligence with firearms 0 0 2 1 7 0 10
Other 1 2 3 6 7 0 19
Total 1 6 8 23 42 10 90
Major Georges P. Vanier, a future 
governor-general of Canada, 
believed that the heavy casualties 
suffered by the 22nd Battalion, 
and subsequent high number of 
replacements which joined the unit, 
adversely affected the battalion 
and contributed to its disciplinary 
problems.
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received a total of 600 reinforcements 
from the 41st ,  57th,  and 69th 
Battalions.54 These battalions were 
based in Britain and were broken up 
to feed units at the front. According 
to Jean-Pierre Gagnon and Desmond 
Morton, these three units suffered 
from significant leadership and 
disciplinary problems. The most 
well-known case is described by 
Desmond Morton in an article 
on the 41st Battalion. As a result 
of recruiting problems, the unit 
depended on other units to fill the 
gaps in their ranks. Morton noted 
that “predictably, they handed over 
their least desirable specimens.”55 
These same specimens soon joined 
the ranks of the 22nd Battalion. 
Morton also noted that the unit’s 
officers were utterly incompetent, 
and provided poor training. Not 
only did they suffer from drinking 
problems, but according to the a 
court of enquiry into the state of the 
41st Battalion in March 1916, “the 
officers did not seem to help and the 
N.C.O.’s less. They dropped out of the 
ranks themselves” during marching 
orders.56 The battalion’s discipline 
became such a problem that two 
of its men, Lieutenant Codère and 
Private Sokolovitch, were involved 
in separate cases of manslaughter.
 The majority of studies on 
military psychology agree that one 
of the most important factors in 
maintaining high troop morale 
is the commanding officer.57 John 
Baynes noted that “the influence of 
the Commanding Officer was the 
greatest overall factor in shaping 
the battalion’s character.”58 Thomas 
Tremblay embodied many qualities 
of a great leader and it is easy to 
understand how his leadership could 
have led to such high spirits and 
morale amongst the men of his unit. 
 Tremblay had the trust of all 
who fought alongside him. In a letter 
dated 5 June 1919, Georges Vanier 
noted that “as long as I followed 
him no harm would come to me.” 
Even when they were in a difficult 
situation, he never lost his confidence 
in his leader and always thought 
that Tremblay “would bring us 
through.”59 Tremblay’s courage was 
also a source of admiration. He was 
an example that all respected. He was 
in the front lines at Courcelette and 
risked his life with his men. After the 
Soldiers of the 22nd Battalion rest in a shell hole on the way to the front, September 1917.
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advance itself, one unknown soldier 
noted:
Lieutenant-Colonel Tremblay went 
forward with the first wave and 
remarking a tendency to move too 
much to the right in the direction of 
Martinpuch, himself ran along the 
whole line, redirecting the advance…
Three times Col. Tremblay himself 
was buried by the earth from shells 
exploding near him.60
This same soldier explained that the 
success of the battle was in large part 
due to Tremblay’s work:
there is no one who is more deserving 
of praise than Lieut.-Col. Tremblay 
himself…He was at the forefront 
of the battle, constantly exposed to 
shell fire and the enemy’s snipers. 
He personally placed the forward 
posts and frequently visited the 
whole line, encouraging his men and 
directing defence…he was timeless 
in his efforts; never even paused to 
sleep and was the soul and spirit of 
the defence.61
 Along with his tremendous 
character, courage and passion, 
Tremblay was a just leader and was 
concerned about the safety and 
the fate of his men. In his history 
of the 22nd Battalion, Chaballe 
noted: “Avant tout, il était juste, ce 
qui est chose capitale chez un chef. 
Connaissant tous ses hommes, il 
s’intéressait à leurs affaires privées. 
Dans la tranchée, il s’arrêtait au cours 
d’une tournée pour s’entretenir avec 
les soldats, demandant des nouvelles 
des parents, s’informant si l’on avait 
écrit, les intérrogeant au sujet de 
la nourriture et des ennuis de la 
guerre.”62
 Tremblay was a very special 
officer and his temporary loss had 
a significant impact on his men. In 
a letter to Henri Bourassa, editor of 
Le Devoir, dated 23 January 1917, 
Corneloup noted, “when the sublime 
Tremblay left, these big children 
looked at one another. Sadness was 
written on their faces. A fear rose 
up, and confidence was gone. The 
second attack [at Regina Trench] 
was an utter failure.” 63 Although the 
loss of Tremblay played a significant 
role in the battalion’s difficulties, 
much of the blame must also fall 
on the shoulders of Major Arthur 
Dubuc, who replaced Tremblay 
after the battle of Courcelette. It is no 
coincidence that the unit’s problems 
increased when Dubuc took over. 
He was unable to restore the unit’s 
morale after the Somme as Tremblay 
had done after St. Éloi. A comparison 
of the little evidence which survives 
of his character and leadership 
demonstrates that he did not share 
the qualities of Tremblay and was 
perhaps, a mediocre leader.64
Two soldiers of the 22nd Battalion repair a muddy trench.
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 Dubuc was unlucky to have 
replaced the almost mythical figure 
of Thomas Tremblay. In contrast to 
Tremblay, Dubuc appeared weak 
and did not command the respect 
and hearts of his men. Evidence 
suggests that several individuals 
believed that Dubuc was incapable of 
leading the unit. As was previously 
noted, the commanding officer of the 
2nd Division, Major General R.E.W. 
Turner, expressed his anxiousness 
about the battalion’s discipline during 
Dubuc’s command and wanted 
Tremblay to return to the front as 
soon as possible.65 Although Claudius 
Corneloup believes that Dubuc 
was a fine commanding officer, 
he nevertheless admitted that he 
had been a problem to many. He 
noted, “il me semble que beaucoup 
ont été injustes envers lui. Sans 
avoir la témérité et l’audace du 
colonel Tremblay, qui était une âme 
extraordinaire, le major Dubuc était 
loin d’un peureux…On a essayé 
de jeter du discrédit sur cet officier 
supérieur…Il n’était pas aimé parce 
qu’il ne savait pas se faire aimer.”66 
 Moreover, it is fair to assume that 
he did not display the same courage, 
and fearlessness as Tremblay. On 
the night following the attack on 
Courcelette, Private Leo Patenaude, 
later promoted to the rank of colonel, 
was ordered to make a dangerous 
run from the new front back to the 
original line. Despite enemy shelling 
and machine gun fire, he reached his 
objective. However, when Dubuc 
was asked to replace Tremblay at the 
front and take the same route that 
he had taken, Patenaude explains: “I 
don’t know if I should say that but 
the second in command [Dubuc] of 
the 22nd unit the same night was 
ordered to report to replace Colonel 
Tremblay in the church where he 
was suffering from piles. The second 
in command went as far as Souvre 
LaFarnier and the firing was so 
intense that he came back to the 5th 
Brigade.”67 Gary Sheffield noted that 
in order to become a true leader, a 
newly appointed commander had to 
gain the confidence and the hearts 
of his men.68 Sheffield thus believed 
that Bernard Montgomery was right 
when he advised that “the first thing 
a young officer must do…is go fight a 
battle, and that battle is for the hearts 
of his men. If he wins that battle and 
subsequent similar ones, his men will 
follow him anywhere; if he loses it, 
he will never do any real good.”69 
Although Dubuc might have rightly 
considered the consequences of 
losing both the commanding officer 
and himself (the second in command), 
and was justified to return, Patenaude 
considered Dubuc’s caution as a sign 
of weakness. The first chance Dubuc 
had to prove that he was a great 
leader was perhaps considered a 
failure.
Conclusion
By examining the discipline of the other battalions of the 5th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade and 
comparing it to that of the 22nd 
Battalion, this article has strengthened 
the understanding of the 22nd 
Battalion’s behaviour, discipline, 
and ultimately, its combat record. It 
first reassesses a common assumption 
about the battalion’s disciplinary 
problems, and reinforces it through 
a comparison of the three units that 
shared the wartime experiences of the 
“Van Doos.” The statistics that were 
gathered, along with the complaints 
from battalion, brigade and divisional 
officers, which were themselves 
unique to the 22nd Battalion, are 
convincing. This article has also 
offered a new perspective on the 
disciplinary problems of the unit 
and has forwarded the theory that 
poor morale could have been a likely 
cause. Explaining why the “Van 
Doos” suffered from a morale crisis is 
a much more complex matter, which 
needs to be further explored as new 
evidence becomes available. At the 
Officers of the 22nd Battalion pose 
for a group photo in June 1918. Unit 
leadership played a signficant role in 
determining morale.
Dagenais - Discipline in 22nd Bn.indd   14 1/26/2010   10:08:52 AM
12
Canadian Military History, Vol. 18 [2009], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss4/2
15
very least, this article has provided 
some plausible explanations – the 
arrival of new recruits and a change in 
leadership – and hopefully intriguing 
leads for other historians. 
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